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standards,	 licensing	 conduct,	 verifying	 outcomes,	 and	 assessing	 remedies.	 In	 some	
areas,	 the	 private	 insurance	 sector	 has	 technological	 advantages	 in	 collecting	 and	





to	 insurers	for	both	risk	coverage	and	safety	 instructions.	The	paper	 illustrates	the	
existing	 role	of	 regulation‐through‐insurance	 in	various	areas	of	 risky	activity,	 and	
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29	This	point	 is	 illustrated	 in	an	example	 in	Ronen	Avraham,	The	Law	and	Economics	of	 Insurance	Law—A	
Primer	37‐39	(2012)	(at	http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1822330).		
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101	 http://www.iinc.org/articles/347/1/The‐Evolution‐of‐Earthquake‐Insurance/Page1.html	 (“In	 1995,	 the	
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